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ABSTRACT. New procurement approaches combined with performance-based building ap-
proaches should reduce costs, but empirical qualitative and quantitative studies are lacking. 
Performance-based maintenance contracts give maintenance suppliers incentives to improve 
their way of working. Innovative, cost-effective solutions that meet the performance criteria 
can be achieved, especially if the principle of whole-life costing is being adopted.  Indirect cost 
savings are expected as well. It enables maintenance contractors to assume responsibility for 
certain activities for which they are better equipped to perform than their clients. A calculation 
model was developed that calculates the net present value of the direct (product) and indirect 
(transaction) costs at project level for a competitive maintenance tendering approach and for 
performance-based maintenance contracts. The fi ndings show that performance-based main-
tenance contracts reduce both direct and indirect costs compared to a competitive tendering 
approach. Essential preconditions are an early supplier involvement and longer term contracts, 
giving opportunities for maintenance product and maintenance process improvements.
KEYWORDS: Maintenance; Performance-based contracts; Transaction costs; Whole-life costing
1. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s Dutch housing associa-
tions were transformed into so-called hybrid 
organisations, “combining task organization 
(implementing public tasks) and market or-
ganization (meeting market demands)” (Prie-
mus, 2001: 247). Both their market and task 
operations forced housing associations to adopt 
a more structured approach to measuring 
and monitoring their performance. The drive 
towards more professional standards led to 
the adaptation of private sector approaches 
to public housing management (Nieboer and 
Gruis, 2004). The new market-based approach 
involved, among other things, the use of port-
folio and asset management, outsourcing of 
non-core activities, the implementation of mar-
keting techniques to attract potential tenants 
or buyers and a broadening in the supply of 
housing-related services. 
The professionalism of Dutch housing as-
sociations has led to paying more attention 
to maintenance processes and partnerships 
in the supply chain of maintenance, leading 
to performance-based maintenance contracts 
too. The housing associations are permitted 
to use long term performance-based contracts, 
because European legislation for public ten-
dering is not mandatory for them. 
1.1. Maintenance tendering approaches
Traditionally Dutch housing associations 
tender planned maintenance projects com-
petitively and formulate technical specifi ca-
tions for the maintenance work. The client 
supervises the maintenance work on-site. 
This process is repeated every maintenance 
interval, defi ned as the period between major 
maintenance work to the same building com-
ponent. This period coincides often the cycle 
of painting (six or seven years). In theory in 
a fi xed-price competitive tendering approach 
the risk for the client is low and the risk for 
the contractor high. However, in practise the 
technical specifi cations are almost never com-
pletely fi nalised and in most cases this results 
in many change orders. Many Dutch housing 
associations hire consultants to assess condi-
tions, to plan and to calculate maintenance, 
and to check on contractors.  
The performance approach is, first and 
foremost, the practise of thinking and work-
ing in terms of ends rather than means. It is 
concerned with what a building is required 
to do, and not with prescribing how it is to 
be constructed (Meacham et al., 2005).  In a 
performance-based maintenance relationship 
performance criteria are explicitly stated by 
the client (Straub, 2007). Performance-based 
contracting clearly alters the nature of the 
risk and its allocation, shifting increased risks 
on to the contractor and away from the client 
(Gruneberg et al., 2007). 
In performance-based maintenance rela-
tionships, maintenance suppliers act as con-
sultants, selected at an early stage, enabling 
them to contribute ideas about maintenance 
strategies, performance criteria, maintenance 
solutions and the fi nancial aspects that apply 
to each building asset. In this approach a key 
issue is the re-design of the relevant build-
ing components by the contractor, to have a 
thorough command of the degradation process 
by taking the necessary initial maintenance 
activities. The re-design is an integral part 
of the specifi cation phase. In the Dutch situa-
tion technical solutions are set down in main-
tenance scenarios and activity plans. A part-
nership agreement is concluded that covers 
a maintenance scenario consisting of several 
maintenance cycles that may last for the entire 
service life of the building (Straub, 2007). The 
client chooses a maintenance scenario based 
upon net present values of whole-life costs 
and related to the performances of the build-
ing components. The scenario and performance 
criteria are set down in a performance agree-
ment. The contractors themselves monitor the 
degradation processes of building components 
by using performance measurements. The pri-
mary purpose of control and supervision by the 
client is to review the maintenance process, 
identify problems and then take the necessary 
action. They assess the completion of the work 
and the performance measurements done by 
the contractors. Contractors also monitor the 
entire maintenance process, especially custom-
er satisfaction during maintenance interven-
tions and thereafter. 
There is a general belief that new procure-
ment approaches combined with performance-
based building approaches will improve per-
formance and service and reduce costs (e.g. 
Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Saad et al., 2002; 
Trimmer and Kidston, 2003). However, empiri-
cal qualitative and quantitative studies are 
scarce. Wood (2006) studied whether partner-
ing is actually delivering win-win outcomes for 
both parties involved. He interviewed 10 major 
UK clients and 10 national contracting organi-
zations. Lower costs for the client and guaran-
teed work for the contractor are the strongest 
and most consistent messages expressed by 
Wood’s respondents. Black et al. (2000) sur-
veyed by postal questionnaire clients, consult-
ants and contractors involved in construction 
projects. Most benefi ts attributable to partner-
ing expected from the parties are better rela-
tionships rather than project-based benefi ts 
(such as improved design, quality improve-
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ment, reduced cost etc.). ”It can be inferred 
that because a better relationship between the 
parties produces the project-related benefi ts, 
the project-based benefi ts have not been rated 
highly by the respondents” (Black et al., 2000). 
Project-related benefi ts might become more ob-
vious in performance-based maintenance rela-
tionships, especially if the whole service life of 
the building is involved and contractors keep 
responsibilities for a long period. Innovative, 
cost-effective solutions that meet performance 
criteria can be achieved, maintenance cycles 
can be extended, and change orders can be re-
duced. Moreover, effi cient risk allocation will 
lead to cost savings. 
1.2. Research question
The paper focuses on the cost savings of 
performance-based maintenance contracts 
compared to competitive maintenance tender-
ing based upon technical specifi cations. The 
research question is: To what extent does per-
formance-based maintenance contracts lead to 
project cost savings compared to the competi-
tive way of tendering planned maintenance 
works? In the study the project costs have 
been calculated for two or more major main-
tenance cycles.
Next the research method is described, fol-
lowed by the used calculation model, the re-
searched projects, the fi ndings of the study 
in the perspectives of whole-life costing and 
transaction costs, and the conclusions.
2. RESEARCH METHOD
In the research project a distinction has 
been made between direct project costs and 
indirect project costs. The direct project costs 
represent the product costs for maintenance 
work during a certain period. For the client ac-
tual payments to the contractor represent the 
product costs: the contract price. The indirect 
project costs are the transaction costs by the 
client and the contractor in connection with 
the procurement process. See Table 1. The 
overall project costs for the client include the 
contract price and his own transaction costs. 
Non-project specifi c costs are relationship-
specifi c asset costs and overhead costs of con-
tractors. Relationship-specifi c assets have lit-
tle value outside a particular relationship of a 
client and a maintenance contractor. However, 
the costs of these assets are not-project specifi c 
but relationship-specifi c. In practise most con-
tractors will be hired for several projects of a 
client. Examples of relationship-specifi c asset 
costs are a performance measurement method 
of the contractor adapted to the needs of the 
client and general agreements of clients and 
contractors. Relationship-specifi c asset costs 
and overhead costs were not implemented in 
the study. 
Project-specifi c asset costs were implement-
ed in the study. The tendering system infl u-
ences directly the types and size of project as-
set specifi city. Williamson (1996) distinguishes 
six types of asset specifi city: (1) site specifi city, 
Table 1. Direct and indirect costs
Direct costs Indirect costs
Project costs Product costs: 
direct labour, materials, equipment, 
transport
Transaction costs
Non-project specifi c costs Relationship-specifi c asset costs 
Overhead costs 
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(2) physical asset specifi city, (3) human as-
set specifi city, (4) dedicated assets, (5) brand 
name capital and (6) temporal specifi city. For 
maintenance services human asset specifi city 
that arises because individuals acquire specifi c 
skills by working for an organisation is the most 
obvious one (Lohtia et al., 1994). Van Mossel 
(2008) refl ected on the types of asset specifi city 
in maintenance: “Every maintenance solution 
is unique. A relatively complex building design 
is more likely to involve unique solutions, and 
therefore increases the challenges posed by as-
set specifi city” (Van Mossel, 2008: 197). Van 
Mossel identifi es the following types of (human) 
asset specifi city in maintenance: (1) knowledge 
of the properties and maintenance solutions, 
(2) knowledge of the process, in particular at 
the operational level, (3) maintenance solu-
tions, (4) offers by the maintenance fi rm and 
(5) built up experience and knowledge of the 
needs of end-customers. The product costs can 
be infl uenced if principles of life-cycle costing 
and whole-life costing are adopted. It is clear 
that the transaction costs can be infl uenced 
by the kind of relationship between the client 
and the contractor. The kind of specifi cations, 
either prescriptive or performance-based, may 
infl uence both.
3. CALCULATION MODEL
A calculation model was developed that 
calculates the net present value of the direct 
and indirect project costs at project level. The 
model used in an initial study was evaluated 
with employees of maintenance contractors 
and housing associations. The adapted model 
links the maintenance scenario and direct 
costs calculation directly to the indirect costs 
calculation and is more user-friendly. A man-
ual was written for maintenance contractors 
and clients to fi ll in the model. This model 
includes project specifi c data, data about the 
maintenance scenarios (competitive and per-
formance-based) and contract prices, and data 
about the indirect costs and the planning of 
future maintenance cycles. The initial pro-
cess – the fi rst maintenance cycle – and the 
subsequent processes consist of all activities 
conducted during a maintenance cycle. Fol-
lowing the initial maintenance process, one or 
more subsequent processes will take place. It 
is assumed that these subsequent processes 
will be equal in scope and transaction costs, 
although the actual maintenance activities 
and product cost undertaken in each can vary. 
The competitive maintenance scenario exists 
of equal recurring product costs every mainte-
nance cycle. See Table 2.
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Table 2. Calculation model for direct costs: product costs maintenance scenario
Competitive Performance-based







NPV = Net Present Value
3.1. Tendering costs
Waara and Bröchner (2006) argue that 
transactions costs for the contractor could easily 
be measured, being the bidding costs. Transac-
tion costs for the client are less easily measured 
and arise through efforts to specify the project, 
to conduct the procurement process, to moni-
tor the chosen contractor, and to resolve any 
confl icts related to the contract. Lingard et al. 
(1998) distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs. Ex-ante costs include the 
costs of tendering, negotiating and writing the 
contract while ex-post costs may be incurred 
during the execution and policing of the con-
tract or of resolving disputes arising from the 
contracted work. Hughes et al. (2006) explored 
the costs associated with different tendering 
approaches and contractual and non-contrac-
tual arrangements for collaboration. They re-
late the management costs to four stages in the 
commercial process: (1) Marketing (developing 
relationships and selling, including pre-quali-
fi cation for preferred tender lists, forming al-
liances, establishing reputations), (2) Agreeing 
terms (pricing and scoping work, estimating, 
bidding and/or negotiating perhaps with some 
elements of design, and fi xing a price), (3) Moni-
toring of work (managing the realization of the 
design, monitoring performance ensuring the 
carrying out of contractual obligations during 
the contract period) and (4) Resolving disputes 
(dispute resolution after the contract period). 
The developed indirect cost model involves 
the transactions costs of the client and the con-
tractor. We call the costs related to the fi rst 
state of the commercial process ‘marketing’ 
relation-specifi c asset costs or overhead costs 
of the contractor. In long term performance-
based maintenance relationships contractors’ 
involvements enclose a part of the whole serv-
ice life of a building. The indirect project costs 
depend on the process activities that must be 
conducted by the client and the contractor re-
spectively throughout the maintenance period 
of the complex. The costs for providing advice 
about maintenance solutions and for conduct-
ing performance measurement are being part 
of the bid price or priced separately. 
The indirect cost model distinguishes 25 
process activities based upon the competitive 
maintenance process and the performance-
based maintenance process. The activities in the 
initial and subsequent processes are clustered 
into fi ve phases: (1) specifi cation, (2) selection, 
(3) contracting, (4) preparation, supervision 
and evaluation work and (5) after-care. The ac-
tivities within the phase preparation, supervi-
sion and evaluation of the work, in the fi gures 
named work, do not involve the maintenance 
production itself. One can discuss if hours spend 
to e.g. site supervision are transaction costs or 
production costs. Anyhow various tendering 
approaches will lead to different time spending 
and costs. Table 3 shows a simplifi ed exam-
ple of a time sheet of the indirect cost model. 
In each column the client and the contractor 
has to fi ll in the hours spend on the activity. 
Labour costs are calculated depending on the 
wage scale.  The costs are based on a differen-
tiation in hourly charges per activity, with the 
level of charges depending on the various wage 
scale groups applied by both the client and the 
contractor. The model assumes that each party 
will have three such groups. Third parties, such 
as consultants or inspection agencies, may per-
form some activities; the costs involved being 
charged to the client and/or contractor. 
4. PROJECTS
An initial study included ten projects. In 
order to make a thorough comparison, 12 
more projects were selected. Each project in-
volves exterior maintenance of housing estates 
owned and managed by a housing association. 
The projects are owned and managed by 13 
different housing associations and main-
tained by 9 different maintenance contractors. 
The number of projects of one housing associa-
tion is between 1 and 4; the number of projects 
of one contractor is between 1 and 6. The cost 
comparison assumed a performance-based ap-
proach, with the applicable basic premises 
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in terms of performance level and mainte-
nance period. The contractors had produced 
a mainte nance scenario, including a price, for 
this period. The maintenance scenario infl u-
ences both the direct and the indirect costs. 
For this research project another maintenance 
scena rio was designed by the client and con-
tractor repre senting the competitive tender-
ing approach. The notional direct and indirect 
costs of this scenario were estimated, based on 
the performance level and maintenance period 
of the performance-based scenario. The main-
tenance history of the building played a sig-
nifi cant part here. It was assumed that the di-
rect costs of painting – including preventative 
maintenance work – are cyclically recurrent. 
Presumably the size and scope of the project 
will infl uence the proportion between direct 
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Table 3. Calculation model for indirect costs: time sheet for project hours of the initial maintenance process
Competitive Performance-based
Client Contractor Client Contractor
Specifi cation
1. Inspection N/A N/A N/A
2. Formulating technical specifi cations N/A N/A N/A
3. Formulating functional and performance criteria N/A N/A N/A
Selection
4. Selection of contractors N/A N/A
Contracting
5. Collecting or adjusting project information





9. Collecting external advice
10. Inviting tenders and assessment subcontractors N/A N/A
11. Designing or adjusting maintenance scenario’s N/A N/A N/A
12. Formulating or adjusting offer
13. Assessment offers N/A N/A
14. Consultation about offers
15. Working out and consultation about activity plans
16. Commissioning and confi rmation work




20. Project delivery and Final acceptation inspection
21. Project process evaluation
22. Customer satisfaction evaluation
After-care
23. Performance measurements
24. Consultation performance measurements
25. Settle performance guarantees
N/A = not applicable
and indirect project costs per procurement ap-
proach. Here a distinction has been made be-
tween ‘simple’ projects, ‘complex’ projects and 
‘total maintenance projects’, depending on the 
scope and type of maintenance work involved, 
and the lead-time of the (initial) maintenance 
process. Ten projects could be classified as 
‘simple’, 7 projects as ‘complex’ and 5 projects 
as ‘total maintenance’. 
The projects studied vary in terms of the 
characteristics of each housing estate, their 
size, maintenance history and original quality, 
and working methods. Accordingly, they are 
not directly comparable one against the other. 
However, each project enables a comparison 
to be made between performance-based main-
tenance contracting and competitive mainte-
nance tendering in terms of direct and indi-
rect project costs. Table 4 gives the project 
characteristics. The distribution of size and 
construction years of the projects is large. The 
number of dwellings is between 27 and 360. 
Table 4. Project characteristics


















Guldenslag 111 1989/1990 Single- and 
multi-family
12 2,916 2,788
Menkamaborgstraat 47 1988 Single-family 6 1,713 1,627
Laan v.d. Bork 88 1971 Single-family 28 14,814 11,465
Dopperlaan 32 1967 Single-family 28 10,680 7,739
Emmalaan, Meerveld 94 1976 Single-family 28 5,551 4,452
Koekoekstraat 28 1997 Multi-family 30 3,229 2,478
Vrijmoedhof 92 1971 Multi-family 30 2,687 2,687
Platte Daken 178 1967 Single-family 24 3,928 3,928
Gerofl at 360 1968 Multi-family 22 2,324 1,894
Lelie 68 1990 Multi-family 28 2,929 2,540
Complex projects
Spaarnestraat 52 1933 Single-family 30 20,507 20,507
Van Tuylkade 204 1950 Multi-family 23 10,284 9,172
Eikenlaan e.o. 102 1949 Single-family 18 6,192 4,169
Akkers 6 179 1980 Single- and 
multi-family
14 5,000 4,303
Eksterstraat 103 1967 Single-family 28 10,329 9,379
Celebesstraat 28 1970 Single-family 29 13,763 13,023
Complex 206 27 1987 Single-family 15 9,691 8,926
Total  maintenance projects
Turpijnplaats 198 1972 Multi-family 30 32,904 21,802
Palazzo 60 1995 Multi-family 30 34,237 27,782
ML Kingstraat/
Mandela
69 1995 Single-family 30 23,993 22,496
Gandhihof 52 1995 Single-family 30 17,680 16,615
Eekhoornweide 45 1978 Single-family 28 16,008 14,456
*excluding the performance guarantee period after the fi nal maintenance interval
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One housing estate was built before the Sec-
ond World War. The housing estates involve 
single- en multi-family dwellings. 
Generally, the competitive tendering ap-
proach as well as the performance-based ap-
proach of both the clients and contractors 
shows a great variety. There are differences 
in process steering by the housing associa-
tion closely connected with the given freedom 
in maintenance solutions by contractors and 
the monitoring of performance by contractors 
and / or third parties commissioned by the cli-
ent. Experience may affect the product costs 
as well as the transaction costs. Two of the 
13 involved housing associations were not ex-
perienced in performance-based maintenance 
contracts. That means that the projects in this 
research were pilot projects for performance-
based contracting. The number of performance-
based maintenance contracts of experienced 
housing associations differs strongly. Just a 
few clients see performance-based contracting 
as the only procurement method and apply 
this approach for all their housing estates. 
5. FINDINGS
From the results the overall project costs 
appear to be lower for performance-based part-
nering than for competitive maintenance ten-
dering. This concerns all kind of projects. The 
average overall project costs difference is 20%. 
In all projects the direct costs (contract price 
minus the indirect costs of the contractor) of 
performance-based contracting are lower, or 
at worst the same, as for competitive main-
tenance tendering. The share of the indirect 
costs of the client in the overall project costs 
is for both tendering approaches small (2–5%). 
The cost savings on contract prices by perform-
ance-based contracting are the biggest for ‘to-
tal maintenance projects’, followed by ‘simple 
projects’. See Figure 1. In the fi gures the com-
petitive maintenance tendering approach is 
the index of 100%.
The indirect costs of the client are lower in 
case of performance-based contracting in the 
initial process as well as in subsequent proc-
esses. On average for all projects the indirect 
costs of the client are 51% lower in case of 
performance-based contracting. See Figure 2.
In all phases with the exception of ‘after-
care’, the costs of performance-based contract-
ing are lower. Cost savings are relatively the 
biggest for the phases of ‘specifi cation’ and ‘se-
lection’. Because of the fact that the client will 
continue the relationship with the contractor 
after the initial process, time and cost being 
spent for selection are in subsequent processes 
very low. See Figure 3. Cost savings in con-
tracting and in work and supervision are very 
clear in the subsequent processes. Not surpris-
ingly is that the client spends more time and 
Figure 1. Average overall costs client, initial 
process and subsequent processes
Figure 2. Average indirect costs client, initial 
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money for after-care if applying a performance-
based relationship.
The indirect costs of the contractors are 
part of the contract price. This research project 
made these costs transparent. Contractors are 
not involved in the phases of ‘specifi cation’ 
and ‘selection’. On average the indirect costs 
of the contractors are 21% lower in the case of 
performance-based contracting. See Figure 4. 
During the initial process contractors spend 
on average more hours. The expectation was 
that ‘simple projects’ are an exception, but 
this is not true. Contractors spend also more 
hours in most of the simple projects during 
the initial process if working performance-
based compared to competitive maintenance 
tendering. Clients give contractors free reins. 
Traditionally in a competitive market there is 
inadequate time to prepare a tender. Contrac-
tors spend relatively much time in the phase 
of ‘after-care’ if working performance-based. 
Those ‘extra’ hours are amply compensated by 
saving hours in the process phases contracting 
and work and supervision, especially during 
subsequent maintenance processes.
5.1. Product costs and whole-life costing
If principles of whole-life costing are adopt-
ed in the maintenance re-design and mainte-
nance scenario, reducing of the product costs 
could be realized by:
 • planning the maintenance activities ac-
cording to the existing level of quality, the 
desired quality and the desired service 
life of a building;
 • ensuring better coordination between 
work to substrates and to the fi nishing 
(paintwork);
 • conducting maintenance activities ‘just-
in-time’ based upon performance measu-
rements.
The performance-based relationship offers 
the contractor greater opportunities to plan 
the maintenance activities to the requirements 
of the client during the duration of the main-
tenance period, and to coordinate maintenance 
activities with each other. This is the result 
of the contractor’s long term involvement in, 
and responsibility – including fi nancial respon-
sibility – for the maintenance project under 
the performance-based contract. The fact that 
the same contractor takes responsibilities for 
both the paintwork and maintenance work to 
the substrates is also important. In the initial 
process, a thorough analysis of the causes of 
defects will be conducted. The contractor will 
select the solution offering the lowest costs 
over the entire service life. Performance-based 
contracting offers a better guarantee of actual-
ly achieving the advantages of condition-based 
maintenance than the competitive approach, 
since it is the contractor who conducts the per-
Figure 3. Average indirect costs client, initial 
process and subsequent processes per phase
Figure 4. Average indirect costs contractor, initial 
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formance measurements and who also bears 
the risks relating to the timely performance of 
maintenance activities. The deterioration can 
be predicted more accurately and maintenance 
cycles may be extended, for example the cy-
cle of paintwork from six to seven years. Ac-
cordingly, in a maintenance scenario of thirty 
years, there would be only four maintenance 
cycles in stead of fi ve. 
The fi ndings show that long term perform-
ance-based contracts have potential for pro-
duction cost improvements, but there are some 
practical barriers to implement the principles 
of whole-life costing by contractors. Pasquire 
and Swaffi eld (2002) list barriers to successful 
implementation of life-cycle costing and whole-
life costing techniques: availability of suitable 
data, project fi nances, short term interest of 
clients, professional fees and taxation issues. 
Housing associations have a long term inter-
est in their properties, but long term mainte-
nance contracts may involve performance im-
provements. Those improvements are fi nanced 
through housings associations’ capital budgets. 
Maintenance budgets are usually under the 
control of a separate department. If housing 
estates are being refurbished main emphasis 
is placed on minimising the initial capital costs 
with little regard for the maintenance costs. 
Another barrier is the desired fl exibility in 
maintenance policy-making by Dutch housing 
associations. The contractor designs a mainte-
nance scenario for a longer period. However, 
the legal contract period should just expand 
just one or two maintenance cycles to give 
owners their desired fl exibility.
5.2. Transaction costs
Client and contractor both make transaction 
costs. In theory, ex ante and ex post transac-
tion costs are interdependent. Reducing of the 
transaction costs can be realized by perform-
ing process activities by the client or contrac-
tor that is best equipped to perform the acti-
vity and by a better management of the entire 
maintenance process. 
Lai et al. (2006) argue that a lesser input of 
ex ante resources would result in a less proper 
contract that requires more ex post manage-
ment efforts. The relationship between con-
tract monitoring cost, which may vary with 
the propriety of contract, complexity of work, 
contractual relationship, capability and qual-
ity of contractor and management teams and 
the monitoring effort is unknown (Lai and Yik, 
2007). We expect that in a performance-based 
maintenance approach the contract monitoring 
cost will be high at the start of the partnership 
and become less during the contact period. The 
used calculation model was not appropriate to 
underpin this expectation.
Hughes et al. (2006) expect that collabora-
tion or other means of re-organising the con-
struction process will transfer the tendering 
costs to more productive activities. Our fi nd-
ings support this expectation for maintenance 
projects. In the competitive maintenance ten-
dering approach, specifi cation of the work by 
the client is time consuming, especially for 
more complex projects. Often information of 
executed projects is lost following the once-on-
ly tendering process. Besides many activities 
of the specifi cation and contracting phase are 
duplicated, i.e. conducted by both client and 
contractor, e.g. inventory, condition assess-
ment and supervision. In the performance-
based approach, clear agreements are made 
with regard to which party is responsible for 
which activity during the contract period. The-
oretically on-site supervision by the client is 
not needed if performances are specifi ed. In-
direct cost reductions are become particularly 
apparent after the initial process. The costs 
of collecting project information, consultation, 
condition assessments and the design of alter-
native maintenance scenarios will decrease 




Long term, performance-based contracting 
offers many advantages compared to the com-
petitive tendering approach. One of the main 
benefi ts is that long term performance-based 
contracting reduces both direct and indirect 
costs. The essential preconditions are long 
term involvement and freedom in the main-
tenance design and process for the contractor, 
giving opportunities for product and mainte-
nance process improvements. The findings 
show that average overall project costs are 
20% lower. The process phases ‘specifi cation’, 
‘selection’, ‘contracting’ and ‘work and super-
vision’ become markedly less expensive in 
case of performance-based contracting. The 
‘after-care’ phase is markedly more expensive 
in every project when the performance-based 
approach is adopted, because of conducting 
periodic performance measurements. For the 
contractor the initial process is more expensive 
within the performance-based approach. That 
this method is nevertheless less expensive 
overall for the contractor is due to the cost re-
ductions in the subsequent processes. Indirect 
cost reductions become particularly apparent 
following the initial process, once both parties 
have gained experience with the project. The 
direct costs can be reduced not only in terms 
of savings on manpower and materials, but 
also – and especially – in terms of incidental 
costs such as the hire of scaffolding and site 
costs. Scaffolding hire represents a gro wing 
proportion of the total direct project costs. 
Longer maintenance cycles enable this type of 
expenditure to be reduced signifi cantly.
Quantifying the costs of tendering is not 
easy. Hughes et al. (2006) found that one of the 
most signifi cant fi ndings from the attempts at 
quantifying the costs of tendering is that the 
number of variables is huge, and it is impos-
sible to isolate factors that infl uence costs di-
rectly. The scope of this study is much broader 
than tendering costs. The study encompasses 
the transactions costs of the contractor and 
the client and the product costs of different 
procurement approaches. This means that the 
outcomes of the study should be interpreted by 
some limitations. The most important one is 
that the cost comparison assumed a perform-
ance-based approach and that the time sheets 
had to be fi lled in for spended hours and for 
expected hours to be spend at process activi-
ties. Contractors spend more hours during the 
initial process of working performance-based 
compared to competitive tendering, because of 
the (intention to) long term involvement. This 
means that a better estimation can be given in 
the performance-based maintenance scenario. 
The client’s initial selection of contrac-
tors is likely to cost more time in the perfor-
mance-based approach than in a competitive 
tendering approach with technical specifi ca-
tions. The selection will not be made for each 
individual project, but the client will divide all 
his projects among a number of pre-selected 
contractors. Prior to the initial phase of the 
fi rst project (or projects) the client and contrac-
tors will be required to devote considerable 
time to seeking out the most appropriate part-
nership form(s), agreeing unit prices and deci-
sive performance indicators, and drawing up 
the relevant framework contracts. However, 
these activities are also part of the traditional 
process, albeit under different names. Like se-
lection, the evaluation of contractors and the 
assessment of customer satisfaction will also 
take place outside the confi nes of individual 
projects, although project-related aspects will 
also be taken into account in the evaluation. 
In performance-based contracts mainte-
nance activities are assigned to the contractor 
for a long period, covering a number of subse-
quent processes and maintenance cycles. This 
means that it is no longer necessary to re-bid 
for each period. This continuity will result in 
lower indirect project costs throughout the sub-
sequent processes for the contractor. The fi nd-
ings show that on average the indirect costs of 
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the contractor are 21% lower in the case of per-
formance-based contracting. This means that 
new activities by contractors, especially advice 
about maintenance solutions and performance 
measurement, do not raise contractors’ trans-
action costs, at least on the project level. The 
execution of these activities demands addi-
tional capabilities from the contractor (Straub 
and Van Mossel, 2007); relationship- specifi c 
asset costs and overhead costs may increase. 
Moreover maintenance contractors must be 
able to achieve a suffi cient level of turnover 
for performance-based contracts in order to 
be able to perform these ‘advisory tasks’ in a 
satisfactory manner. Due to the continuity of 
the performance-based contracts maintenance 
contractors can improve their internal busi-
ness processes, with more effi cient logistical 
deployment of manpower and equipment, and 
more effi cient purchasing of materials. This 
will reduce the overhead costs. 
In a traditional multiple, competitive ten-
dering process a lower contract price may be 
the outcome compared to the price of a per-
formance-based contract. This is especially 
the case in very competitive markets, like the 
Dutch maintenance market at present. How-
ever, on the long term and under changing 
market circumstances, clients and contractors 
believe that this will have no effect. 
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SANTRAUKA
TAUPYMAS NAUDOJANT VEIKLOS REZULTATAIS PAGRĮSTAS PRIEŽIŪROS SUTARTIS 
Ad STRAUB
Nauji pirkimo būdai, derinami su subalansuotos statybos būdais, turėtų mažinti išlaidas, tačiau trūksta empirinių 
kokybinių ir kiekybinių tyrimų. Veiklos rezultatais pagrįstos priežiūros su tar tys skatina priežiūros paslaugas siū-
lančias bendroves tobulinti savo darbo būdus. Galimi no vatoriški, taupūs sprendimai, tenkinantys rezultatyvios 
veiklos kriterijus, ypač taikant viso naudojimo laiko išlaidų (angl. whole-life costing) principą. Tikimasi sumažinti 
ir netiesiogines išlaidas. Priežiūrą atliekantiems rangovams tai leidžia prisiimti atsakomybę už tam tikrą veiklą, 
kuriai vykdyti jie turi daugiau priemonių nei jų klientai. Sukurtas skaičiavimo mo de lis, kurį taikant apskaičiuo-
jama viso projekto tiesioginių (produktas) ir netiesioginių (sandoris) są nau dų dabartinė grynoji vertė (NPV), kai 
vykdomas priežiūros darbų pirkimo konkursas ir kai sudaromos veiklos rezultatais pagrįstos priežiūros sutartys. 
Rezultatai rodo, kad, lyginant su pirkimo konkursais, veiklos rezultatais pagrįstos priežiūros sutartys mažina 
ir tiesiogines, ir netiesiogines išlaidas. Būtinos sąlygos – įtraukti į priežiūros vykdymą tiekėją ankstyvuosiuose 
etapuose ir sutartis sudaryti ilgesniam terminui, suteikiant galimybių tobulinti produktą ir priežiūros procesą.
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